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Creating A Genetic Underclass: The
Potential for Genetic Discrimination by
the Health Insurance Industry
I. Introduction
Imagine the following: you are a healthy individual, married
to a healthy spouse, with healthy children. You attempt to
purchase health insurance coverage for yourself and your family.
As a prerequisite to eligibility, the insurance company requires
both you and your spouse to submit to a variety of genetic tests.1
Because you are both in good health and have never suffered
from serious illness, you feel confident that there is no reason for
concern. Therefore, you both freely consent to the simple blood
tests.' Neither you nor your spouse are aware of any history of
1. According to the American Council of Life Insurance Medical Section Committee
on Genetic Testing, "[g]enetic tests are laboratory tests used to determine the presence
or absence of abnormal or defective genes and/or chromosomes. Such tests are direct
measures of such defects or abnormalities, as opposed to indirect manifestations of ge-
netic disorders." AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE AND HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIA-
TION OF AMERICA, REPORT OF THE ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING 1991 2
(1991) [hereinafter ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE]. Genetic tests employ various technologies
to detect pre-existing genetic traits, changes in chromosomes, or changes in deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA), the chemical bearer of genetic information. OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (1990)
[hereinafter GENETIC MONITORING]. See infra Part II for a further discussion of DNA;
and infra note 2 for a discussion of the various tests. Genetic testing by insurers involves
screening individuals to identify particular inherited traits or disorders. See NElL HOLTZ-
MAN, PROCEED WITH CAUTION 193-200 (1989).
2. Today, DNA tests are administered through a variety of diagnostic techniques.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE 18 (1988)
[hereinafter MEDICAL TESTING]. Because DNA is present in all body cells, it can be easily
extracted from blood and stored for an indefinite period. GENETIC MONITORING, supra
note 1, at 78. In prenatal genetic tests, fetal cells are obtained through amniocentesis.
1
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illness within your families. Unfortunately, the test results show
that you are a carrier of the DNA markers that indicates a pre-
disposition to lung cancer.' Faced with the prospect that you
may develop lung cancer and become an economic drain through
huge medical costs, the insurance company denies coverage to
you and even to your family because of the possibility that your
children may carry the gene. Your family is left without health
insurance, despite the fact that you have not manifested any
symptoms of the disease and your children have not been tested
to determine if they even possess this risk-laden genetic make-
up.
In November, 1991, Earvin "Magic" Johnson announced his
early retirement from professional basketball because he had
tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).'
The announcement provoked disbelief at Johnson's tragedy and
controversy at Johnson's disclosure that he became infected
from "messing around with too many women. '"6 Amidst the up-
roar, one fact seemed forgotten; a fact that underlies this trag-
DAVID SUZUKI & PATRICK KNUDTSON, GENETHICS: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW GENETICS
AND HUMAN VALUES 148 (1990). Because most DNA-based tests for genetic disorders are
technically difficult, costly to perform, and are sometimes unreliable, widespread use of
genetic testing is limited. MEDICAL TESTING, supra, at 19. Most blood tests are limited to
biochemical profiles that are derived from analyzing a battery of twelve or more tests per
blood sample. Id. at 122. See generally id. at 121-41 (explaining technical background of
HIV screening). See also GENETIC MONITORING, supra note 1, at 77-95 (discussing the
technical molecular background behind genetic testing). Diagnostic tests offered by bio-
technology firms range in price anywhere from $200 to $980 per test, and can rise as high
as $3000. Id. at 95; Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based
Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109,
116 (1991) [hereinafter Genetic Discrimination]. For example, the test for Huntington's
disease costs $450 per sample. GENETIC MONITORING, supra note 1, at 95. See infra Part
II for a further discussion of diagnostic tests administered by biotechnology firms.
3. Genetic tests identify diseases by isolating a "marker," an "unusual DNA se-
quence that is believed to be inherited with a disease causing gene." DOROTHY NELKIN &
LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS 27 (1989). Markers are detected through
techniques that fragment DNA drawn from blood cells so that the region on a chromo-
some where a defective gene is located can be identified. Id.
4. Lung cancer is the leading cause of cancer death among Americans. GENETIC
MONITORING, supra note 1, at 91. There is evidence of various genetic defects that con-
tribute to the development of cancer. Environmental exposures such as smoking may
exacerbate this condition. Id.
5. Richard W. Stevenson, Magic Johnson Ends His Career, Saying He Has AIDS
Infection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at Al.





edy and is telling of the direction technology is leading our soci-
ety. Johnson did not decide to submit to an acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) test because of his personal concern
of infection, rather he consented to an AIDS test along with sev-
eral other tests as part of a routine annual procedure mandated
by his insurance company.7 Johnson's experience reflects the
growing use of diagnostic testing by insurance companies to
screen applicants for eligibility and rate-setting purposes.' John-
son is fortunate that his public figure status sets him apart from
the rest of society, and he probably does not have to worry that
this discovery may threaten his insurance coverage. The major-
ity of society does not enjoy the same economic status as John-
son, and the potential for abuse by insurance companies that use
diagnostic testing as a tool for profit is greater than ever before.
Genetic researchers are continuously unearthing secrets of
the human body that seem to indicate that the course of life
does not lie with fate, but rather with inherited human qualities
that are determined long before birth.9 New diagnostic tests that
probe DNA sequences for the genetic markers of diseases that
are inherited through families can predict illnesses long before
they are clinically manifested. 10 Hundreds of genetic markers
have been identified that indicate an inherited predisposition
not only to physical and mental illness, but to physical and per-
sonality traits." Diagnostic genetic tests can provide enormous
7. Stevenson, supra note 5, at B12.
8. See Nancy E. Kass, The Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Concerning the Use of
Genetic Tests by Insurers: Toward the Development of Appropriate Public Policy (Janu-
ary 1992) (manuscript available from National Institutes of Health, National Center for
Human Genome Research).
9. See Rick Weiss, Bio-Menace: Genetic Discrimination, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1989,
at D3.
10. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 4.
11. To date, thousands of hereditary genes have been discovered. These include: the
gene associated with Huntington's chorea, a fatal, degenerative disease that affects the
brain; the gene associated with neurofibromatosis, or "Elephant Man's Disease;" and the
gene associated with cystic fibrosis, a debilitating lung disease that was first discovered
through "mapping" of family history. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MAPPING OUR
GENES; GENOME PROJEcTS: How BIG, How FAST? 134-35 (1988) [hereinafter MAPPING OUR
GENES]; Natalie Angier, Scientists Discover the Gene in a Nervous System, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1990, at Al, col. 2; Sandra Blakeslee, Scientists Find Hope for Victims of Cystic
Fibrosis by Discovering its Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1989, at B13, col. 1. See infra Part
II notes and accompanying text for a more expansive discussion of genetic mapping.




benefits, including early detection of predisposition to illness
that creates an opportunity for preventive care. 12 Identifying
and understanding the DNA sequences of disease-causing genes
will also lead to discoveries of cures and new preventive treat-
ments. Prenatal screening for genetic disorders provides parents
with a choice of whether to raise a child with an untreatable
disease. ' In nonclinical settings, genetic tests can provide legal
evidence of an individual's criminality 4 or provide early detec-
tion of learning disabled children. 5
Despite all the apparent benefits associated with genetic in-
formation, it also carries "potential for social detriment."' 6 Ge-
netic testing raises serious concerns that the identification of an
individual's predisposition to illness may be used in ways that
harm the individual. The insurance industry, employers, and the
government all have an "immediate or potential interest in pro-
moting large-scale genetic screening to identify" those individu-
als who carry genetic disorders. 7 This is particularly true in the
clinical setting, where genetic information may reduce or pre-
vent access to health care through the loss of insurance. In this
setting, testing becomes a means of identifying those individuals
who are potentially at risk for future illness, and therefore pre-
sent a potential insurance risk. Critics charge that insurance
of cancer, and emphysema have also been located. See John Carey, The Genetic Age,
Bus. WK., May 28, 1990, at 68; see generally Benjamin S. Wilfond, The Cystic Fibrosis
Gene: Medical and Social Implications for Heterozygote Detection, 263 JAMA 2777
(1990) (discussing the background and regulation of screening for cystic fibrosis); Gina
Kolata, Scientists Pinpoint Genetic Changes That Predict Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
1989, at Cl (reviewing genetic research into particular kinds of cancer); Shannon
Brownlee & Joanne Silberner, The Assurances of Genes, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP.,
July 23, 1990, at 57 (describing Huntington's chorea).
12. NzLKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 7. Among the benefits are "disease preven-
tion through genetic counseling, and treatment of the disorders through genetic manipu-
lation." Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 110.
13. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 7.
14. Id. at 151. DNA tests are currently used in the courts to establish the identity of
suspects in criminal cases when the key evidence is biological material such as blood or
semen. Diagnostic tests are also used to provide evidence that correlates violent behavior
with brain abnormalities. Id. See also Andrea De Gorgey, The Advent of DNA
Databanks: Implications for Information Privacy, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 381 (1990).
15. Carey, supra note 11, at 78.
16. Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 110.
17. Paul S. Billings, Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J.




companies may abuse genetic tests to legitimate arbitrary exclu-
sionary practices that "enhance institutional power with little
regard for the rights ... of individuals."' 8 Thus, insurance com-
panies may rely on genetic tests to deny access to health insur-
ance, shifting the burden to the government to take care of the
health care bill for the uninsured. 9
In this age of genetic wizardry, genetic testing is a double-
edged sword. It allows for early diagnosis and treatment of dis-
eases and disorders, and possibly even their elimination. How-
ever, the social, medical, and legal issues surrounding the use of
genetic tests are of a dimension not yet realized. In the field of
health insurance, genetic testing threatens to infringe upon indi-
vidual rights because it can be used to separate individuals into
"insurable" and "uninsurable" groups.2 0 Insurers may use ge-
netic markers as a basis for denying coverage or determining
rates and eligibility unfairly. "The fact that genetic diseases are
sometimes closely associated with discrete ethnic or racial
groups such as African Americans, 2' Ashkenazi Jews2 or
Armenians"8 compounds the potential for discrimination." '24 In
addition, if insurance eligibility is tied to the results of genetic
testing, individuals will seek confidentiality for the results of
these tests. Genetic testing raises serious concerns about dis-
crimination,25 the right to privacy, and whether the legal world
is prepared to confront these issues before their impact is widely
felt.
This Comment will examine genetic research and its poten-
18. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 8.
19. Kass, supra note 8, at 1.
20. The terms "insurable" and "uninsurable" connote separate insurance pools
which are distinguished according to insurance risk classifications. See infra Part III for
a discussion of insurance risk classification.
21. Sickle cell disease. Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 111 n.9.
22. Bloom's Syndrome, Gaucher's disease, or Tay-Sachs disease. Id. at 111 n.10.
23. Family Mediterranean Fever. Id. at 111 n.11.
24. Id. at 111.
25. It is important to distinguish between insurers mandating genetic testing and
insurers having access to genetic information. ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at
8. The use of mandatory genetic tests by insurers for determining eligibility is remote,
however, genetic testing is increasingly performed by clinicians. It is this information
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tial impact on health insurance.26 Part II profiles the historical
background behind this issue and the technologies used. Part III
outlines the basic principles underlying insurance risk classifica-
tion. Part IV addresses the potential for abuse of genetic testing
by both insurers and private citizens. Part V examines current
legislation to determine whether the law recognizes a right to
confidentiality in genetic testing and whether existing legislation
invites discrimination against genetically tested individuals.
Current legislation is also evaluated to determine whether ge-
netic testing by third parties violates existing statutes and
whether analogies can be drawn to statutes that protect other
groups at risk. Part VI proposes possible reforms to confront the
implications of genetic testing. Part VII concludes that a ban on
the use of genetic information for health insurance underwriting
is needed to protect individuals from genetic discrimination.27
II. Background
Before the profound legal and social effects of genetic test-
ing can be appreciated, it is necessary to understand the basic
principles of the technology and its application. The Human
Genome Project 2 8 is a massive2 9 international research initiative
26. Genetic testing also has a potential impact on life insurance. However, some of
the strongest concerns about genetic testing focus on the accessibility and availability of
health insurance. See ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 4. The ACLI-HIAA
Task Force report presumes such fervor arises over health insurance because "life insur-
ance is not perceived as an entitlement to the same extent as health insurance." Id.
Although many of the issues raised in this Comment apply to both health and life insur-
ance, this Comment will focus on health insurance. See generally MEDICAL TESTING,
supra note 2.
27. Genetic discrimination is defined as "discrimination directed against an individ-
ual or family based solely on an apparent or perceived genetic variation from the 'nor-
mal' human genotype." Billings, supra note 17, at 476.
In a recent study, Dr. Paul Billings of the California Pacific Medical Center com-
piled information regarding actual cases of genetic discrimination. Id. Forty-one separate
incidents of discrimination were reported; thirty-two involved insurance discrimination
and seven involved employment discrimination. Id. at 478. Many of the individuals in
the study possessed a hereditary condition but were asymptomatic and healthy. Id.
28. The agencies involved with the research efforts on the human genome use differ-
ent terminology to refer to these efforts. At the National Institutes of Health, the term is
the "Human Genome Project." At the Department of Energy, it is the "Human Genome
Program." Other references also include the "Human Genome Initiative." H.R. RaP. No.
478, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 7, n.9 (1992).
29. "[T]he scope of... [the Human Genome Project) would be unparalleled in the
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/6
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
to study and detail the genetic structure of human DNA.30 The
long-term goal of the project is to map and sequence the molecu-
lar structure of all human genes, including disease-causing genes
hidden within the DNA structure. 1 The research project, pri-
marily funded by the United States, is scheduled to last at least
fifteen years and cost an estimated three billion dollars.2 The
two major United States government institutions sponsoring the
genome project are the National Institutes of Health and the
United States Department of Energy. 3 The genome project in-
cludes an unprecedented study of the social, legal, and ethical
issues raised by genetic testing.3
The structure of DNA was discovered in 1953 by Dr. James
Watson, who won a Nobel Prize for his achievement.35 DNA is a
double helix structure,3 6 partially composed of four nucleotide37
history of the life sciences .... This [project is] among the ranks of such ambitious, goal-
oriented Big Science projects of the past as the building of the first atomic bomb or
sending astronauts to the moon." SUZUKI, supra note 2, at 316-17.
30. Elke Jordan, Invited Editorial: The Human Genome Project: Where Did it
Come From, Where is it Going?, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1 (1992). Although the United
States was the first country to initiate research efforts, other programs are under way in
the United.Kingdom, France, the European Community, and Japan. Id.
31. A gene is a unit of hereditary information. MAPPING OUR GENES, supra note 11,
at 21. The genome is the total genetic endowment packaged in the chromosomes. MEDI-
CAL TESTING, supra note 2, at viii. The genome has also been defined as "[all the genetic
material in the chromosome of a particular organism; its size is generally given as the
total number of base pairs." Jon Beckwith, The Human Genome Initiative: Genetics'
Lightning Rod, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 2 n.8 (1991) (quoting United States Dep't of
Health & Human Services and Dep't of Energy, Understanding Our Genetic Inheritance,
The U.S. Human Genome Project, The First Five Years, FY 1991-1995 86 (1990)).
32. Jordan, supra note 30, at 1.
33. The United States Department of Energy began a genome research program in
1987. James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project and International Health, 253
JAMA 3322, 3323 (1990). Within the National Institutes of Health, the project is admin-
istered by the National Center for Human Genome Research. Smaller genome research
projects are also under way at the United States Department of Agriculture and the
National Science Foundation. Combined federal funding for these programs exceeded
$85 million in 1990. Id.
34. Jordan, supra note 30, at 4. Three areas earmarked for ethical study are: "pri-
vacy of genetic information, protection from discrimination based on genetics, and safe
introduction of genetic tests into mainstream medical practice." Id.
35. Dr. Watson headed the National Institutes of Health's Genome Project until
April 10, 1992, when he resigned over concerns regarding his investments in biotechnol-
ogy firms. Head of Federal Gene Research Agency Resigns, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1992, at
A18.
36. Each molecule of DNA is composed of two separate DNA strands that are held




bases: guanine (G), cytosine (C), adenine (A), and thymine (T).5
The bases occur in pairs, and the arrangement of these pairs is
defined as the sequence. 9 The sequence of the base pairs in the
DNA encodes the genetic information. ° Thus, the encoded ge-
netic information can be described by sequences of base pairs
such as GCATGTATCCTGTA.'
1
The base pair sequences that make up DNA are used by the
body to manufacture proteins.42 In its simplest form, a sequence
is "read" by the body, which generates messenger ribonucleic
acid (RNA).' s Messenger RNA is then decoded by the cell to
form proteins. 4 Proteins, such as enzymes and hormones, con-
trol body activities and functions.45 Thus, the genetic code es-
tablishes traits that are passed from one generation to the
next. 6
The human body carries fifty to one hundred thousand
genes.4 7 A human gene can vary in size from less than ten thou-
sand base pairs to more than two million.'8 The human genome
consists of approximately three billion base pairs strung along
the forty-six human chromosomes.4'9 The Human Genome Pro-
ject aims to ultimately map the sequence of all three billion base
pairs that make up the human genome °
The first step to mapping a gene is charting the location of
together like a spiral staircase to form the double helix. Id.
37. A nucleotide is a molecular subunit Id.
38. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN PREVENTION
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 48 (1983) [hereinafter ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING]; SUZUKI,
supra note 2, at 32. For a more detailed discussion, see generally HOLTZMAN, supra note
1, at 9-20. The bases are projected from each strand and act as "steps" that bridge the
two strands. SUZUKI, supra note 2, at 32.
39. MAPPING OUR GENES, supra note 11, at 21.
40. Robert A. Weinberg, The Dark Side of the Genome, TECH. REV., Apr. 1991, at
44.
41. ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING, supra note 38.
42. SUZUKI, supra note 2, at 34.
43. See generally id. at 34-95.
44. ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING, supra note 38, at 49.
45. Id.








the gene on the chromosome." Genes are located by finding mi-
nor genetic variations, called polymorphisms, that occur
throughout human DNA and act as markers.52 These markers
are easily detected, and act as identifiable regions on a chromo-
some that are useful for locating nearby genes.5 3 Creation of ge-
netic linkage maps within families is accomplished by tracking
variations in these genetic markers .5  When parents have differ-
ent forms of a marker, the linkage of the marker to a particular
gene can be followed in the child.55 Using family linkage studies,
scientists can now locate a particular gene associated with a spe-
cific disease.56
Genetic discoveries are not limited to disease-causing genes,
but also include genes that belie a predisposition or susceptibil-
ity to a particular disease.5 7 "Some common disease susceptibili-
ties, such as heart disease or cancer, are correlated with an al-
tered gene." 58 However, this correlation does not mean that all
heart disease and cancer is related to such susceptibility genes.59
The actual development of the disease is a result of a combina-
tion of factors, such as other genes and the environment.8 0 The
discovery of a genetic mutation associated with heart disease has
made early detection a matter of life and death for carriers, who
51. SUZUKI, supra note 2, at 305.
52. MAPPING OUR GENEs, supra note 11, at 27.
53. Id. A specific polymorphism .may be associated with a gene variant that causes a
disease. Id. at 28-30. These "linked polymorphisms" can then be used as indicators in
predictive genetic tests. See Jason Brandt et al., Presymptomatic Diagnosis of Delayed
Onset Disease with Linked DNA Markers: The Experience in Huntington's Disease,
261 JAMA 3108 (1989).
54. MAPPING OUR GENES, supra note 11, at 27.
55. Id. For a more complete description of genetic linkage mapping, see id. at 26-30.
See generally Brandt, supra note 53.
56. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 28. One of the oldest methods for studying
human gene linkages is through the study of family histories. SUZUKI, supra note 2, at
307. By tracing a particular trait through a family tree, patterns of inheritance are de-
tectable. Id. Single gene hereditary illnesses such as cystic fibrosis are the simplest to
detect because they only require the location of one gene or its associated marker. ROLE
OF GENETIC TESTING, supra note 38, at 51. There are currently over four thousand known
single gene hereditary illnesses. E. Donald Shapiro, Dangers of DNA: It Ain't Just Fin-
gerprints, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1990, at 1.







can reduce the risk of developing the disease by changes in diet
and exercise."' Ultimately, genetic discoveries may unearth ge-
netic susceptibilities to mental illnesses such as manic depres-
sion and schizophrenia, and to addictive behaviors such as
alcoholism. 2
Genetic isolation of several diseases has resulted in easy
identification of the associated genetic flaw through simple
tests.63 Current tests use blood or urine samples to test for
chemical properties of certain genes. 4 The market for the tests
is huge.6 5 Within days of the discovery of the cystic fibrosis gene,
two companies, Integrated Genetics and Collaborative Research,
offered a diagnostic test priced at up to two hundred dollars per
test.6 This potential for large profits fuels genome research. 7 As
genetic discoveries accelerate, tests proliferate, and prices drop,
insurers will be increasingly tempted to use them.8
Genetic tests, however, are not always correct. Genetic tests
unaccompanied by a detailed family history leave room for er-
ror. 9 Also, "It]he sensitivity of genetic testing is limited by the
known mutations in a target population. ' 70 "Moreover, genetic
61. Carey, supra note 11, at 70.
62. Id. at 71, 78.
63. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 15-16.
64. Id.
65. Recent reports predict that genetic tests will generate a two hundred million
dollar to one billion dollar per year market for biotechnology companies. Carey, supra
note 11, at 69; NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 33. Screening tests are currently
available for several common cancers such as colon, breast, and uterine/cervical cancers.
MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 16. Tests are also available for heart disease, diabetes,
and other rare diseases. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 33, 28-29.
66. Carey, supra note 11, at 71.
67. See generally id.
68. See generally Kass, supra note 8. The ACLI-HIAA Task Force reports that cost
is a practical reason that has prohibited widespread use of genetic testing by insurers.
ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 5. The Task Force further points out that it
will be "years and perhaps decades before insurers could realistically afford genetic test-
ing on any wide-scale basis." Id.
69. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 135-40. Genetic test results may be inaccu-
rate due to the possibility of multiple mutations that cause the same condition. "Linkage
tests," tests that identify a marker associated with a causative gene rather than the gene
itself, are generally reliable only to the extent that the marker is very close to the disease
causing gene. Id.
70. Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 113; HOLTZMAN, supra note 1, at 198-
99. For example, because the cystic fibrosis (CF) chromosome is detectable in only 75%




testing is not based on causality, but on correlation. 7 1 The un-
derlying premise of most genetic tests is not that the identified
gene will always give way to illness, but that certain genetic
markers are present in the chromosomes of people suffering
from inherited illnesses.72 These genetic markers are then used
to single out high-risk groups and sub-groups.7 8 However, "the
onset date, severity of symptoms, and efficacy of treatment and
management are highly variable. ' 7 Thus, the results of genetic
tests are far from scientific certainty.7 5
III. Health Insurance and Risk Classification
The concept of insuring against loss by distributing risk
dates back five thousand years.7 6 Modern American health in-
surance effectively began in 1929 with the Baylor University
Hospital Plan. This plan served as the model for the nonprofit
Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BC/BS) organizations that still ex-
ist today. 8 Private commercial health insurance blossomed in
the 1940s, and by 1953 it covered more Americans than the BC/
BS organizations. 79 Before considering the insurance industry's
need to employ genetic tests as a basis for risk classification, a
basic understanding of the American health insurance industry
and the principles of insurance classification is compulsory.
ble. Wilfond, supra note 11, at 2779. Based on statistical analysis, it is further estimated
that "one out of every two couples from the general population identified by CF popula-
tion screening as 'at risk' will be falsely labeled, and therefore, may experience increased
anxiety or discrimination, or needlessly alter their reproductive plans." Genetic Discrim-
ination, supra note 2, at 114.
71. Katherine Brokaw, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employers' Liabil-
ity, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 317, 321 (1990).
72. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 132-39.
73. Panel Discussion, Role of the Knowledge of High Risk Groups in Occupational
Health Policies and Practices, 29 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 143, 145 (1979).
74. Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 114.
75. Id.
76. EMMET J. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 67 (5th ed. 1989).
For instance, as early as 3000 B.C. Chinese merchants distributed the risk of loss during
shipment by shipping some of their goods on each other's boats. Id. The cost of losing
any particular boat was thus split among the merchants. Id. at 68.
77. Id. at 75. See Kass, supra note 8, at 2.
78. VAUGHAN, supra note 76, at 75.




A. Health Care Financing Systems
Today Americans may be covered under a variety of com-
mercial and nonprofit health care financing systems.80 The four
major systems are nonprofit BC/BS organizations, commercial
health insurers, self-insured health benefit plans, and health
maintenance organizations (HMOs)."1 Each system will be
briefly discussed and their common reliance on risk classification
will be explained.
BC/BS organizations are nonprofit health insurers that gen-
erally serve a limited geographic region.82 Most BC/BS organiza-
tions operate like commercial insurers, except that some states
require them to have an annual open enrollment period.83 There
are approximately seventy-seven BC/BS organizations nation-
wide,84  providing coverage for about seventy-nine million
people.85
Commercial health insurance providers are for-profit com-
panies.86 Commercial health insurers are not generally required
to provide open enrollment periods, and are usually not re-
stricted to a specific geographic area. 7 There are roughly one
thousand commercial health insurers88 that provide health in-
surance to approximately 111 million people.8 9
Self-insured health benefit plans have become a major pro-
vider of health insurance over the last fifteen years.9 0 Self-insur-
ance is typically used by large employers, who can directly pro-
80. VAUGHAN, supra note 76, at 285. Not all of these health care financing systems
are technically insurance. For example, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) are
not considered insurance, but they provide similar benefits to members and are generally
not distinguished by consumers. Id. at 76.
81. Henry T. Greely, AIDS and the American Health Care Financing System, 51 U.
PITT. L. REV. 73, 77 (1989).
82. VAUGHAN, supra note 76, at 285.
83. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 57. An open enrollment period is a limited
period of time where the organization must provide a policy to any applicant regardless
of his/her health status. Kass, supra note 8, at 4. Roughly thirty-one percent of BC/BS
organizations have open enrollment periods. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 57.
84. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 57.
85. Kass, supra note 8, at 7.
86. Id. at 3.
87. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 57.
88. VAUGHAN, supra note 76, at 267.
89. Kass, supra note 8, at 7.




vide insurance for their employees, rather than hire an outside
insurance company or other provider.9 Companies began self-
insuring in the 1970s in an effort to cut the cost of employee
benefits.9 2 Self-insurance offers several other advantages to large
employers; most importantly, the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)95 exempts self-insurance plans
from most state insurance regulations. 4
Technically, HMOs are not health insurers. HMOs are
health care providers, but they operate on the same basic princi-
ples as insurers. HMOs provide comprehensive medical services
to members in return for a fixed monthly fee.95 HMOs grew at
an annual rate of twenty percent from 1981 to 1986, and as of
1987 over twenty-seven million people were enrolled in HMOs."6
B. Risk Classification
Health insurance coverage is provided under either group or
individual policies.9 7 Group policies are generally issued to em-
ployers, unions, or other large affiliations of people. 8 Most com-
mercial insurers and BC/BS organizations provide both group
and individual policies.99 HMOs rarely allow individual enroll-
ment.100 Self-insured health benefits plans are not easily classi-
fied as group or individual, but may have characteristics of both
types of policies.
The critical differences between group and individual poli-
cies are the use of risk classification and the method of under-
writing.10' The American insurance market is a private, volun-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
94. Under ERISA, self-insured plans are not required to comply with state laws re-
quiring minimum insurance benefits, anti-discrimination standards, payment of insur-
ance premium taxes, or participation in insurance risk pools. MEDICAL TESTING, supra
note 2, at 55.
95. VAUGHAN, supra note 76, at 275.
96. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 58.
97. Id. at 41.
98. Id. at 42.
99. Id. at 56-58.
100. According to the Group Health Association, no more than four percent of HMO
members are enrolled as individuals. Id. at 59.
101. Id. at 42. Underwriting is "[tihe process of selecting risks and classifying them




tary market;'0 "thus, risk classification is a fundamental part of
the insurance system.103 Underwriting is used by insurers to de-
termine whether, and on what basis, they will accept an applica-
tion for insurance.104 The premise of underwriting is that the in-
sured should pay a premium according to the risk presented."0 5
An insurer's goal is to accurately assess the quality of risk of the
applicant and establish premiums that reflect that risk.106 Thus,
risk classification is used to set rates directly related to the an-
ticipated cost of assuming the risk of a particular individual.'0 7
Insurance companies base underwriting decisions on medical in-
formation from various sources, including the insurance applica-
tion, attending physician's statements, medical examinations,
and information services such as the Medical Information
Bureau.' 08
A basic tenet espoused by insurance companies is their re-
sponsibility to treat all policyholders fairly and equitably.'0 9
Therefore, premiums charged should correlate to the risk an in-
dividual policyholder presents to the insurer."10 "Basic to the
concept of providing insurance to persons of different ages,
sexes,... occupations and health histories ... has been the right
of the insurer to create classifications to recognize the many dif-
ferences which exist among individuals.""' Characteristics that
impact risk assessment, such as age, health, gender, occupation,
and frequency of alcohol or tobacco use, are analyzed to deter-
MERRITT Co., GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 210 (Thomas E. Green ed., 1987).
102. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 41.
103. JUDITH K. MINTEL, INSURANCE RATE LITIGATION 113 (1983).
104. ALBERT H. MOWBRAY, ET AL., INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 459 (6th ed. 1969).
105. See id. at 411.
106. Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Incalano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale
for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1806, 1810 (1987).
107. Herman T. Bailey, et al., The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classifi-
cation, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 780 (1976).
108. John C. Angle & John J. McCuistion, Risk Selection and Substandard Risks,
in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK (Davis W. Gregg & Vane B. Lucas eds., 3d ed.
1973); HOLTZMAN, supra note 1, at 196. See infra text accompanying note 169 for a
description of the Medical Information Bureau.
109. Bailey, supra note 107, at 781-82.
110. Id. at 782.




mine their effects on an individual's mortality."' The influence
these characteristics have on mortality forms a basis for insur-
ance companies to classify individuals into groups with compara-
ble mortality risks and charge appropriate premiums."13 Thus,
risk classification allows insurers to maximize profits and effi-
ciency by charging different rates based upon risk, and compete
for customers by offering lower prices to lower risk
individuals." 4
The value of any risk classification is increased by its ability
to create prevention incentives on the part of insureds."' Ide-
ally, the variable on which the classification is based should be
one in which the insured exercises control. 16 One way to mea-
sure prevention incentives is the degree to which risk classifica-
tions are based on variables within the insured's control."17 For
example, smoking is a controllable addiction that is used by in-
surers in risk classification. Charging lower premiums for non-
smokers is an incentive for smokers to quit smoking, which in
turn, lowers the expected loss to insurers."' Because the ability
of the classification to influence an individual's behavior is an
indicator of the classification's efficiency, controllable variables
are more efficient risk classification tools.
Some variables, even if extremely accurate and efficient,
cannot be used for other reasons and are considered suspect
classification variables." 9 Examples of suspect variables are
those based on racial or ethnic groups. 1 0 Use of race or ethnic
heritage as a classification variable is considered unacceptably
discriminatory and is generally not allowed. 12
112. ROBERT I. MEHR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 657-59 (8th ed. 1985). Indi-
viduals and family members are required to complete forms detailing their medical his-
tories. HOLTZMAN, supra note 1, at 194. If applicants are at increased risk for a disease,
the insurance company may seek additional information from other sources. Id.
113. See generally id.
114. See Bailey, supra note 107, at 782; see generally KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIB-
UTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
115. ABRAHAM, supra note 114, at 71.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 72-74.
118. Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Ac-
tuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 349, 413 (1986).
119. ABRAHAM, supra note 114, at 92-93.





The use of risk classification is in natural tension with the
basic insurance function of risk distribution.12 2 Risk classifica-
tion seeks to sort the insured population into relatively homoge-
nous groups.123 In a competitive market, effective risk classifica-
tion gives an insurer a competitive edge."' If an insurer's system
is extensively classified, that insurer will skim the low-risk popu-
lation "away from insurers whose classifications are less re-
fined.' 1 25 This can leave a high-risk group faced with premiums
so high that they are essentially uninsurable. Such extensive seg-
regation of risks works against the basic concept of risk distribu-
tion that is the foundation of insurance. 12 6
IV. Potential Abuses
The availability of predictive and diagnostic genetic tests,
and their potential use for health insurance risk classification,
highlights the conflicting interests of the health insurance indus-
try and the individual's right to privacy.12 7 Access to genetic in-
formation is a means of planning long-term health costs for both
individuals and insurers. 28 For insurers, the information may be
used to deny coverage or increase insurance rates based on an
individual's genetic risk.' For the individual, genetic informa-
tion often carries profound benefits, affording an individual a
chance to begin preventive care. 30 The potential for abuse of
genetic information must be considered from both the individ-
ual's and the insurer's perspective.
A. Public Concerns
For individuals, the use of genetic testing by insurers
presents several problems, but the most significant is the fear
122. Id. at 65.
123. See id. at 74.
124. Id. at 68. See also NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 58.
125. ABRAHAM, supra note 114, at 68.
126. Id. at 65.
127. See ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 4. Right to privacy involves is-
sues of confidentiality not only in preventing insurers from acquiring genetic informa-
tion, but also in keeping information obtained by insurers confidential. Id.
128. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 3, at 70-73.
129. ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 4.




that insurers will use genetic information in the classification of
risks.1" 1 Opponents believe that such use threatens to create a
"genetic underclass. 13 2 Fear exists that the use of genetic tests
will serve as a tool for denying access to health care either
through higher premium rates, or by outright denial of insurance
coverage for high-risk individuals.' On more basic moral
grounds, individuals should be respected as "autonomous beings
who hold views, make choices and take actions based on their
personal values and beliefs."''1 Individuals should have the right
to voluntarily determine whether they want to know if they are
at risk for genetic illness and who should have access to their
genetic information. In addition, because genetic testing cannot
always provide conclusive results, its use should be approached
with caution. 13 5 False positive test results sometimes occur, and
even individuals with true positive results may never become
ill. ' The questionable reliability of genetic tests undermines
their use as an efficient risk classifier.137
A 1986 survey by the Health Insurance Association of
America (HIAA) estimated that 158 million Americans under
the age of sixty-five were covered by some form of group health
insurance and nine million more were covered by individual
health insurance.3 3 Group policy insurance is "essentially low-
cost, mass protection.' 3 9 The basic premise of group policies is
131. See generally id. One slightly related ethical concern is the loss of the individ-
ual's right not to know his/her genetic makeup. If genetic tests are required by insurers,
individuals will be forced to look at their future health prospects, something not every-
one wants to do. Furthermore, those who do want to know "may be dissuaded from
seeking early diagnostic tests because they may lose the insurance coverage needed to
prevent the disease." H.R. REP., supra note 28, at 17.
132. ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 4.
133. Eric T. Juengst, Priorities in Professional Ethics and Social Policy for Human
Genetics, 266 JAMA 1835, 1836 (Oct. 2, 1991).
134. Kass, supra note 8, at 24.
135. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 136-40.
136. Brokaw, supra note 71, at 327.
137. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 20.
138. Clifford & ucalano, supra note 106, at 1808. In addition, "most people in the
United States acquire health insurance (and often disability and life insurance) as sub-
scribers to group plans through their employment." 0. W. J. Quarrell, et al., Insurance
and Presymptomatic Diagnosis of Delayed-Onset Disease, 262 JAMA 2385, 2385 (1989)
(replying to 0. W. J. Quarrell from Jason Brandt, et al.); see supra Part III for a discus-
sion of various insurance plans.




that in a large group, although some individuals may require
more expensive care than others, the overall risk and costs are
balanced over a wide pool. Group insurance underwriting evalu-
ates the risk of an insurable group to determine premium rates
and coverage terms. 140 Because of the nature of group insurance,
individuals are not generally classified into separate risk catego-
ries, and are therefore at less risk of discrimination based on the
use of genetic testing.1 41
In contrast, insurers underwriting individual health insur-
ance consider the characteristics of each individual applicant. 41
Self-insurers also often consider the health status of individual
job applicants because future medical costs are incurred directly
by the company. 43 As a result, those seeking coverage under in-
dividual policies or self-insured plans face greater potential for
discrimination than those who have access to group insurance.
In the absence of genetic testing for risk classification, the
risk associated with genetic diseases or susceptibilities is distrib-
uted over the entire insured pool. 4 Currently, insurance compa-
nies must pay for treatment of a genetic disorder when it is
manifested unless the policy specifically excludes coverage for
such an illness. 45 Thus, the costs associated with genetic disor-
ders are spread across the insurance pool just as the costs of
other diseases are distributed.
Another potential concern for all policyholders relates to
pre-existing condition clauses in both group and individual poli-
cies. Health insurance coverage is usually limited to current ill-
nesses and does not cover pre-existing conditions.' 46 If genetic
defects qualify as pre-existing conditions, potential savings could
be significant enough that insurers will seek the use of genetic
tests even in the group insurance setting. Further, such pre-ex-
isting condition clauses could permit insurers to use genetic tests
140. MowBRAY, supra note 104, at 350.
141. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 42-45.
142. VAUGHAN, supra note 76.
143. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 45.
144. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 114, at 67-68.
145. Joseph M. Miller, Genetic Testing and Insurance Classification: National Ac-
tion Can Prevent Discrimination Based on the 'Luck of the Genetic Draw,' 93 DICK. L.
REV. 729, 741 (1989).




as a basis for avoiding liability on a policy long after it is
written.147
B. Insurance Industry
Currently, neither insurers nor employers require genetic
testing to obtain coverage, but insurers use other tests to gather
medical information that is "strongly influenced by genetic fac-
tors."148 Insurers have powerful economic incentives for using
genetic testing. Genetic testing can defray costs and guard
against potentially unprofitable patients.' 49 Insurers argue that
access to diagnostic tests, including genetic tests, is necessary to
keep the industry intact.' 50 Insurers also argue that individuals
possessing a genetic predisposition to disease will burden the
rest of the insurance pool through high medical costs once they
become ill.15'
The insurance industry is based on the principle of shared
risk.152 Appropriate levels of contribution are spread across the
insurance pool based on a risk assessment of each individual. 5 3
Individual risk classification enables insurers to set rate sched-
ules according to individual risk. Genetic testing would enhance
risk classification by providing predictive information of an indi-
vidual's chances of future illness. Not only can insurers benefit
from distinguishing high-risk individuals, but employers who
provide self-insured health benefit plans also stand to benefit by
147. See Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 135..
148. Phillip Reilly, ASHG Statement on Genetics and Privacy: Testimony to
United States Congress, 50 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 640, 641 (1992). For example, individ-
uals who purchase large life insurance policies must usually consent to cholesterol tests.
Id. Diabetes and high blood pressure tests are also used in qualifying for life and health
insurance. Id. Applicants are often required to reveal detailed family histories. Id.
149. "Unprofitable" patients within this context are individuals whose genetic
profiles place them in high-risk categories. High-risk categories include those individuals
whose genetic make-up is possibly degenerative or fatal, or both. See NELKIN & TAN-
CREDI, supra note 3, at 58-59.
150. See Suzanne M. Russell, Prohibiting AIDS Testing in the Health Insurance
Context: Patching Up a Patchwork System, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
131, 134 (1990).
151. Id.
152. See generally Kass, supra note 8. See supra Part III for further explanation of
risk classification.




minimizing potential employee medical costs.154 "The economic
integrity of insurance companies is premised on the concept that
an equitable 'risk selection and classification' is necessary in or-
der for insurance companies to remain viable.' 1 55 Insurers are
businesses that must protect themselves from unprofitable
investments.
Insurers argue that they should have access to all informa-
tion that bears significantly on risk classification.' 56 Failure to
use this information will result in the "subsidization of high-risk
persons by low-risk groups. ' 157 If this information remains un-
disclosed, it unfairly burdens the low-risk group. In addition,
customers may be lost if low-risk individuals believe that the
benefits of coverage are not worth the cost of high premiums.158
Insurers also argue that genetic testing to determine eligibil-
ity is analogous to current insurance classification techniques. 5 9
Classification factors currently used include age, sex, health sta-
tus, health history, financial status, and occupation. 60 Just as
individuals who have poor driving records pay higher premiums
for automobile insurance, individuals who smoke pay higher
health insurance premiums than nonsmokers.' 61 Moreover, pre-
miums for women are generally cheaper than for men because
women live longer. 6 2
Perhaps the industry's gravest fear lies in the possibility
that applicants "could use genetic testing to foresee coverage
154. Ray Moseley, et al., Ethical Implications of a Complete Human Gene Map for
Insurance, 10 Bus. AND PROF. ETHICS J. 75 (1991).
155. Id. at 74.
156. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 47.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Insurers currently use information available from other sources such as per-
sonal medical histories - to trace past illnesses and conditions; family medical histo-
ries - to identify concerns regarding parents, children, and spouses; and various tests
to determine current physical conditions. See Moseley, supra note 154, at 77. See also
MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 45.
160. MEDICAL TESTING, supra note 2, at 45.
161. See Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification; The Sound of
One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 837 (1986); Robert Wright, The End
of Insurance; Human Genome Project Could Remove Uncertainty from Actuarial Ta-
bles, NEW REPUB., July 9, 1990, at 26.




needs and exploit the insurance system."'16 "Adverse selection"
is the abusive purchase of insurance by individuals who are
higher risks than their insurers are aware."" Adverse selection
drives up the costs of the insurance pool. The result is an unfair
distribution of these costs due to increased premiums for all pol-
icyholders, including healthy individuals with few medical
costs.
65
Currently, insurance companies protect themselves against
adverse selection in three ways. 66 First, insurers protect them-
selves by including pre-existing condition clauses in both group
and individual policies. These clauses provide that if a pre-ex-
isting condition is discovered "within two years after the policy
is sold, the policy can be canceled or rewritten.1 67 A pre-ex-
isting condition is one that existed prior to the applicant's policy
and has "impaired the applicant's health to some degree.""
Second, some protection is afforded by the Medical Information
Bureau (MIB). 169 Over seven hundred insurance companies be-
long to the MIB, which acts as an insurance databank carrying
medical findings and test results on health and life insurance ap-
plicants. The MIB currently does not carry genetic informa-
tion.170 Finally, insurance companies may require the applicant
to submit to a physical exam before providing coverage.
In 1990, the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) and
the HIAA formed a task force to study the issues surrounding
the industry's use of genetic testing. The Task Force found that
"[n]o insurer - life or health - currently requires genetic
tests. 17 1 However, the ACLI and the HIAA consider genetic in-
formation as "potentially relevant to risk classification as any
other medical information. 1 72 The Task Force has stated that
"the ACLI and the HIAA should continue to aggressively defend
163. ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 8. See also H.R. REP., supra note 28,
at 18.
164. ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 8.
165. Wright, supra note 161, at 27.
166. HOLTZMAN, supra note 1, at 195.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 196.
170. Id.
171. ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 5.




their member companies' need to have access to and to consider
any relevant health information for underwriting purposes, in-
cluding genetic test information.' 73
V. Current Legislation
Since 1868, the federal government has not significantly reg-
ulated the insurance industry.174 Initially, insurance was not
considered interstate commerce, and regulation was left com-
pletely to the domain of the states.17 5 Insurance companies were
free to develop and set rates and policies pursuant to each
state's regulatory law. 7 6 However, by 1944 the insurance indus-
try "had grown to such an extent that its operation no longer
could be regarded as anything less than 'commerce'. . . . In
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,7 8
the Supreme Court overruled earlier case law and held that the
insurance industry was subject to congressional regulation under
the Commerce Clause. 7 9 Industry fear of federal regulation
prompted the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) 80 to propose legislation that would maintain state regu-
latory authority.' "
The NAIC proposal became the McCarran-Ferguson Act,18
which mandated that regulation of the insurance industry re-
main in the hands of the states. 83 Shortly after the enactment
173. Id.
174. Kass, supra note 8, at 6.
175. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869) (holding that "[i]ssuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of interstate commerce," and thus, is regulated by the
states), overruled by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 323 U.S. 811
(1944).
176. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 52-68 (1987).
177. Bailey, supra note 107, at 781.
178. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
179. Id. See Bailey, supra note 107, at 781.
180. The insurance industry formed the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners in 1871 to promote uniformity in insurance regulation and to protect insurance
policyholders. JERRY, supra note 176, at 81.
181. Id. at 53.
182. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (Supp. II 1988).
183. Section 1011 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act states that, "the continued regula-
tion and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public inter-
est, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." 15 U.S.C. §




of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the insurance industry recog-
nized the need for uniform legislation to allow insurers to trans-
act business across state lines. 184 The NAIC began to formulate
model statutes to guide insurance regulation, and today contin-
ues to develop model codes and act as a clearinghouse for insur-
ance industry regulatory information. 185
Despite the efforts of the NAIC, state insurance statutes are
still fragmented. 86 However, state regulations generally provide
for the control of rates to prevent inadequate, excessive, or dis-
criminatory practices; the prevention of unfair trade practices by
insurers; and the prevention of insolvency of insurers to protect
the interests of insureds.1 7 Rate-setting regulations seek to en-
sure that rates are sufficient to prevent insolvency without being
excessive, and are at the same time fairly and equitably distrib-
uted among individuals.188 Generally insurers are free to cooper-
ate in devising rate schedules. 189 These rate schedules are sub-
mitted for approval to the state administrative agency that
regulates insurance. 90
The greatest area of difficulty lies in achieving the proper
balance in rates to prevent discrimination among insureds. 191
Generally, risks are classified to closely match individual premi-
ums with the risk they present. However, errors in risk classifi-
cation or the use of many classifications can increase administra-
tive costs and, in turn, increase premiums beyond the savings
achieved by classification. 12
and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the law of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." Id. § 1012(a). Section 1012(b)
states that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,....
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . ." Id. § 1012(b).
184. See S.S. HUEBNER & KENNE'H BLACK JR., LiFE INSURANCE 655 (10th ed. 1982).
185. JERRY, supra note 176, at 81.
186. Id. at 68-69.
187. See id. at 69. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 780-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1992),
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1211-22:1217 (West 1978 & Supp. 1992), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 176D § 1-14 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992), N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2401-2409, 2602-2610 (Mc-
Kinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
188. JERRY, supra note 176, at 72.
189. Id. at 71.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 72.




All fifty states have enacted legislation requiring fair and
equitable treatment of insured parties in the insurance under-
writing process."'3 These state insurance laws are largely based
on the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA),9 a model code de-
veloped by the NAIC. 95 The UTPA permits, and to a degree
even requires, discrimination but distinguishes between fair and
unfair discrimination.'. For example, under the UTPA unfair
discrimination results when identical premiums are charged to a
sixty year old man in poor health and a twenty year old woman
in good health.19 7 Insurers must determine an equitable pre-
mium for both parties, and the "rates should be adequate but
not excessive and should discriminate fairly between insureds..
. so that each insured will pay in accordance with the quality of
his risk."' 98
The UTPA proscribes "unfair discrimination between indi-
viduals of the same class and of essentially the same hazard."' 99
The UTPA is generally interpreted to permit any classification
variable as long as a "statistical difference between groups can
be known, while ignoring other issues. '20 0 Fair discrimination
generally means that insurers must establish rates based on a
measurement of the burden shifted to the insurance fund by
each policyholder.20' Anything less is unfair discrimination.2 2
In most of the state insurance discrimination statutes, inter-
pretation of recurring phrases such as "unfair discrimination"
193. Bailey, supra note 107, at 782. Similar provisions prohibiting unfair discrimina-
tion are common to almost all state insurance statutes. Id. By October 1991, only Ala-
bama, Illinois, Oregon, and Wisconsin had not adopted the provisions of the NAIC Un-
fair Trade Practices Act or similar legislation. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
GUIDELINES, VOL. IV, page 880-11-14 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs Oct. 1991).
194. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES, VOL. IV, page 880-1 (Nat'l
Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs Jan. 1991).
195. See Bailey, supra note 107, at 782.
196. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES, VOL. IV, page 880-1 (Nat'l
Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs Jan. 1991). Bailey, supra note 107, at 782-83. Rates should dis-
criminate fairly between insureds and reflect each insured's risk classification; rates
should not be unreasonable or excessive. Id.
197. Id.
198. MOWBRAY, supra note 104, at 411 (emphasis in original).
199. NAIC MODEL LAws, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES, VOL. IV, page 880-4,UTPA §
4(g)(2) (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs).
200. Wortham, supra note 118, at 370.





and "same class involving essentially the same hazard" is left to
the judiciary.2 " Cases have interpreted such terms in the same
way that the UTPA has been interpreted.2 ' Thus, underwriting
within the spirit of state anti-discrimination laws binds an in-
surer to accord similar treatment to those with similar health
risks.20 5
The cases illustrate that risk classification is recognized as a
fair means of establishing premiums. Generally, insurance com-
panies have free reign to conduct health-related non-discrimina-
tory screening in order to classify the risk of an applicant. 20 6 The
only significant exceptions are found in statutes that forbid in-
surers from denying insurance to individuals carrying the sickle
cell trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or HIV-infected or AIDS-diagnosed
individuals. °7
A. State Regulation of the Use of Genetic Testing
In April 1992, Wisconsin became the first state to ban the
use of genetic testing in health insurance underwriting. 208 The
203. Miller, supra note 145, at 747-48.
204. See Physicians Mutual Ins. Co. v. Denenberg, 327 A.2d 415, 418 (1974) (defin-
ing "unfair discrimination" in the underwriting process to prohibit premiums unrelated
to actuarial risk); Hilson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 132 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.
1943) (holding that risk classification to determine rates is not discrimination); Reeves v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (interpreting insurance
risk classification as a non-discriminatory means for rate-settings).
205. Clifford & Incalano, supra note 106, at 1811.
206. Kass, supra note 8, at 12.
207. See infra Sections IV.B., C. for a discussion of these statutes.
208. 1991 Wis. AcT 269 (enacted Apr. 29, 1992). This Act created § 631.89 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West 1992). Section 631.89(2) states that:
[a]n insurer... may not do any of the following: (a) Require or request directly or
indirectly any individual or a member of the individual's family to obtain a ge-
netic test. (b) Require or request directly or indirectly any individual to reveal
whether the individual or a member of the individual's family has obtained a ge-
netic test or what the results of the test, if obtained by the individual or a member
of the individual's family, were. (c) Condition the provision of insurance coverage
or health care benefits on whether an individual or a member of the individual's
family has obtained a genetic test or what the results of the test, if obtained by
the individual or a member of the individual's family, were. (d) Consider in the
determination of rates or any other aspect of insurance coverage or health care
benefits provided to an individual whether an individual or a member of the indi-
vidual's family has obtained a genetic test or what the results or the test, if ob-
tained by the individual or a member of the individual's family, were.
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
Wisconsin law amended the state's existing insurance code to
prohibit health insurers from requiring any individual to obtain
a genetic test, to reveal that he or she has undergone genetic
tests in the past, or to disclose the results of such tests.2"' In
addition, health insurers are prohibited from denying insurance
or setting premiums based on whether an individual has ob-
tained a genetic test or on the results of such a test.210
No other state has banned the use of genetic tests by health
insurers, but some states restrict the use of genetic information
or are considering a prohibition like that of Wisconsin. Califor-
nia statutorily prohibits an insurance company from classifying
applicants or choosing premiums for life or disability insurance,
but not health insurance, on the basis of an individual's genetic
make-up.2 1 The California Insurance Code section 10143 pro-
vides that:
[n]o insurance company ... shall refuse to issue or sell or renew
any policy of life or disability insurance after appropriate applica-
tion solely by reason of the fact that the person to be insured
carries a gene which may, under some circumstances, be associ-
ated with disability in that person's offspring, but which causes
no adverse effects on the carrier. Such genes shall include, but not
be limited to, Tay-Sachs trait, sickle cell trait, . . . and X-linked
hemophilia A. '12
Further, the code provides that "[n]o such policy issued.., shall
demand or require a higher premium rate or charge by reason of
the fact that the person to be insured carries such traits ... ," 213
In 1991, the California legislature passed a bill that would
have prohibited most health care plans from refusing to enroll or
charge different premiums to any person because that person
"carries a gene which may, under some circumstances, be associ-
ated with disability in that person or that person's offspring. "214
The legislation, however, was vetoed by Governor Pete Wil-
son. 15 A similar bill is again pending before the California
209. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.89(2)(a), (b) (West 1992).
210. Id. at § 631.89(2)(c), (d) (West 1992).
211. CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West & Supp. 1992).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Cal. Assembly Bill 1888 Sec. 8 (1991).





A proposal to amend Michigan's insurance code to prohibit
the use of genetic testing was also recently introduced.2 17 The
Michigan proposal defines "[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insur-
ance" to include a refusal to insure "because the insured or ap-
plicant for insurance declined to submit to genetic testing or be-
cause of the results of genetic testing. "218
Other states have enacted legislation that addresses the use
of genetic testing or test results, but does not prohibit their use
as a basis for denial of coverage or calculation of premiums. The
Maryland Insurance Code provides that "[a]n insurer may not
refuse to insure or make or permit any differential in ratings,
[or] premium payments,... solely because the applicant or poli-
cyholder has the sickle cell trait, . . . or any genetic trait which is
harmless within itself, unless there is actuarial justification for
it.,"219
Arizona statutorily provides that "[n]o insurer shall refuse
to consider an application for life or disability insurance on the
basis of a genetic condition .... ,,220 Further, Arizona law pro-
vides that:
[t]he rejection of an application or the determining of rates, terms
or conditions of a life or disability insurance contract on the basis
of a genetic condition ...constitutes unfair discrimination, un-
less the applicant's medical condition and history and either
claims experience or actuarial projections establish that substan-
tial differences in claims are likely to result from the genetic
condition.2 11
Thus, an individual possessing a gene for a life-threatening dis-
ease or disorder is unprotected in Arizona and Maryland if the
insurer can provide actuarial justification for use of the genetic
trait in underwriting.
The issues relating to HIV status and certain genetic dis-
ance, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1907 (Oct. 21, 1991).
216. 1991 Cal. Assembly Bill 3152 (introduced Feb. 20, 1992).
217. 1991 Michigan House Bill No. 5991 (introduced June 30, 1992).
218. Id.
219. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 223(3) (1988).
220. Aiuz. INS. CODE § 20-448(D) (West 1990).




eases that are distinctive to specific racial groups are closely re-
lated to genetic testing and concerns about confidentiality.
Many states have enacted legislation to prohibit unfair discrimi-
nation against carriers of sickle cell anemia.22 In the 1970s in-
surance companies charged higher premiums or denied coverage
to African-Americans who carried the sickle cell trait.22 Work-
place discrimination also occurred against such individuals. In
the early 1970s laws requiring sickle cell screening were passed
in twenty states, only exacerbating the discrimination.224 How-
ever, Florida, Louisiana, and North Carolina enacted laws
prohibiting such discrimination and by the mid-1970s most state
laws requiring sickle cell testing had been repealed.225 With the
enactment of state legislation, such unfair discrimination ap-
pears to have ended. Under the Florida statute, no insurer "shall
refuse to issue and deliver any policy of life insurance solely be-
cause the person to be insured has the sickle cell trait. '226 Simi-
larly, the Louisiana Insurance Code prohibits unfair discrimina-
tory premiums, or insurance coverage denial to a person solely
because the applicant has the sickle cell trait.227 Genetic traits
for other diseases are no different from genetic traits for sickle
cell anemia.
Tay-Sachs disease (TSD)22s screening programs were also
implemented in the early 1970s. 229 TSD screening can identify
whether parents are carriers of the disease.230 If both parents are
222. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-5-13 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9706 (West 1984);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1 (West Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-207 (1989).
Sickle cell anemia is a single gene "hereditary blood disorder found almost exclu-
sively in black populations." Szum, supra note 2, at 144. Individuals who inherit the
sickle cell gene from both parents suffer from painful, often life-threatening symptoms of
sickle cell anemia. Individuals who inherit one sickle cell gene and one normal gene are
considered to have sickle cell trait. Individuals with the sickle cell trait show no clinical
symptoms of sickle cell anemia. Id.
223. GENETIC MONITORING, supra note 1, at 41-42.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 42. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.9706-626.9707 (West 1984); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §22:652.1 (West Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-195.5 (1982).
226. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9706 (West 1984).
227. LA. INS. CODE § 22.652.1 (1992).
228. "TSD is a rare inherited, incurable, neurological disease most prevalent in Jews






carriers they have a twenty-five percent chance of having a child
with TSD.23' As a result of screening in the United States, the
incidence of TSD in the Jewish population has been reduced by
at least seventy percent.2 32 Similar to sickle cell anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, some states have enacted anti-discrimination stat-
utes to prevent discrimination against individuals who carry
TSD.
B. HIV/AIDS Testing
Like individuals who carry "abnormal" genetic traits, HIV-
infected individuals have an interest in protecting the confiden-
tiality of their health status.23s No statute affords HIV-positive
individuals absolute confidentiality.23 4 All states require the re-
porting of AIDS cases and HIV-positive test results, but vary
regarding identification of the infected individual.23 5  Those
states that provide confidential testing also vary as to the degree
of confidentiality. 3 6 Some states support confidentiality but still
require reporting of the subject's name to state health offi-
cials. 2 7 Nevertheless, "there is little state legislationthat specifi-
cally treats discrimination on the basis of HIV [status]. '"28
Several states have enacted legislation to forbid access to
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Larry Gostin, A Decade of a Maturing Epidemic: An Assessment and Direc-
tions for Future Public Policy, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 17 (1990). Disclosure of an individ-
ual's HIV status can lead to employment and/or insurance discrimination. Id.
234. Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS:
Legislative Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 163 (1991).
235. Id. at 166.
236. Illinois prohibits revealing names except to approved researchers with the sub-
ject's consent. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7354 (Smith-Hurd 1988). Nebraska and Ma-
ryland prohibit any reporting of HIV testing data except in statistical summaries. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-502.04 (1990); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-207 (1991).
237. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1402 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6002
(Supp. 1991).
238. Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 234, at 211. Some states specifically address
the issue of discrimination based on HIV status as it relates to insurance. West Virginia
prohibits cancellation or refusal to renew insurance policies based on HIV status. W. VA.
CODE §§ 33-15-13, 33-16-9 (1992). Illinois and Iowa permit insurance testing for HIV but
only with the applicant's prior informed consent. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5403(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 505.16 (West Supp. 1992). However,




HIV tests results by insurers.3 9 Such bans recognize the poten-
tial for discrimination if test results are made available to insur-
ers. In New York, an individual's interest in privacy extends to
his or her HIV status,240 and the disclosure of an individual's
HIV status without consent is prohibited.24 New York's legisla-
tive intent is expressed as the hope that this protection will
stimulate "voluntary confidential testing for the human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) so that individuals may come forward,
learn their health status, make decisions regarding the appropri-
ate treatment, and change the behavior that puts them and
others at risk of infection.
242
However, Connecticut protects the insurer's right to
know.243 Connecticut provides that "[n]o person who obtains
confidential HIV-related information may disclose or be com-
pelled to disclose such information, except to ... (11) [1]ife and
health insurers . . . in connection with underwriting and claim
activity for life, health, and disability benefits ...."244
Genetic testing raises similar concerns regarding confidenti-
ality of test results. "Discrimination based on an infectious con-
dition can be as inequitable as discrimination based on other
morally irrelevant grounds such as race, gender, or handicap. ' ' 245
Confidentiality of HIV-related records and protection from dis-
crimination based on HIV status have been addressed by state
legislation in an effort to encourage voluntary HIV testing.
2 41
Similar protection and legislation could be applied to genetic
testing.
C. Federal Legislation on Genetic Testing
At the federal level, the House of Representatives is consid-
ering legislation introduced by Rep. John Conyers, Jr., (D-
239. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 631.90 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
240. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
241. Id.
242. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780 (McKinney Supp. 1992) (Hist. & Statutory
Notes).
243. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-583(a) (Supp. 1992).
244. Id.
245. Gostin, supra note 233, at 19-20.




Mich.), to safeguard the privacy of individuals who submit to
genetic testing."' The Human Genome Privacy Act is a response
to the ethical questions""8 raised by the Human Genome Project.
The Human Genome Privacy Act proposes to
safeguard individual privacy of genetic information from the mis-
use of records maintained by agencies or their contractors or
grantees for the purpose of research, diagnosis, treatment, or
identification of genetic disorders, and to provide to individuals
access to records concerning their genome which are maintained
by agencies for any purpose.2 49
Congress held hearings on the bill on October 17, 1991,250 and it
is currently pending before the House Government Operations
Committee. While this bill would protect an individual's privacy
interest in genetic information collected by the federal govern-
ment, it does not address the use of genetic information pro-
vided by other sources. Thus, the bill would have no effect on a
health insurer's ability to require genetic testing as a condition
of coverage or to deny coverage based on genetic information
otherwise obtained.
The bill has found support from the American Society of
Human Genetics (ASHG).2 ' The ASHG views the bill as the
foundation of a comprehensive plan to protect individual pri-
vacy.252 The ASHG has delineated several guidelines that they
believe are critical to any successful plan. Any plan must be
based on the premise that unauthorized disclosure of genetic in-
formation to third parties "may seriously harm the individual
who has been tested. 2 5 3 Such a plan must also determine "who
should be authorized to collect genetic information, how it
should be stored, how it may be linked to other data, [and] who
247. H.R. 2045, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
248. Possible ethical questions include the potential consequences of the use of ge-
netic testing by nonclinical third parties such as insurers. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra
note 3, at 6.
249. H.R. 2045, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
250. Domestic and International Data Protection Issues: Hearings Before the Gov-
ernment Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcomm. of the House of Representa-
tives Comm. on Government Operations, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).






should control access to it."12 " Furthermore, the ASHG believes
that the plan must delineate rules "that clearly define the per-
missible and impermissible uses of such data by third parties
such as insurers, employers, and school systems. ' '255
D. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Federal and state legislation prohibit discrimination based
upon characteristics including race, gender, religion, national or-
igin, age, and disability.2 56 However, there are no statutory safe-
guards that directly protect against discrimination based on the
immutable characteristic of one's genetic make-up. If a genetic
condition is recognized as a disability, significant protection
from abuse may lie in disability law. The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) of 1990257 extended the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to protect individuals with disabilities. A disability is de-
fined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities . . . ; (B) a record of
such impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment. ' 258 Physical or mental impairment includes any physi-
cal disorders, disfigurements, or any mental or psychological
handicap, such as retardation or illness. 59
Regulations interpreting the ADA do not discuss discrimi-
nation based on genetic predisposition to disease.260 Persons who
suffer a current genetic disability, such as cystic fibrosis, are
clearly protected. 61 In addition, the ADA protects not only the
actually disabled but also those who are "regarded" as dis-
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 119.
257. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et. seq. (West
Supp. II 1990). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 701-796 (1988)) survives the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and continues to be the principal legislation affecting persons with disabilities who
work for the federal government. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12209(a)(2) (West Supp. II 1990). See
Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 120 n.58.
258. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West Supp. 11 1990).
259. Id.; see Genetic Discrimination, supra note 2, at 122.
260. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1992); see Rorie Sherman, Employer Use of Genetic Tests to
Be Restricted?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 15.




abled.12 Whether the interpreting regulations take a restrictive
or expansive construction of this provision will determine
whether genetic predisposition to disease is covered by the
ADA." ' Even if persons with genetic predispositions are in-
cluded, the protection provided by the ADA does not extend to
risk classification for purposes of insurance underwriting. 264 The
impact of the ADA on the field of health insurance is limited to
those individuals who obtain health insurance through their em-
ployer.26 5 The ADA allows employers to require pre-employment
medical examinations only after a job offer has been made..26  In
addition, any medical exams and inquiries about disabilities
must be "job-related and consistent with business necessity. 26 7
Finally, the ADA prohibits an employer from "participating in a
contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the ef-
fect of subjecting a . . . qualified applicant or employee with a
disability to discrimination," including relationships to provide
fringe benefits.2
Considered together, these provisions appear to effectively
prevent an employer from denying health insurance based on ge-
netic testing, but do not restrict the premiums charged for such
coverage. Since many employers have established self-insured
health benefit plans, they have a significant incentive to discrim-
inate in hiring based on genetic predispositions. If the ADA does
prohibit employment discrimination against individuals with ge-
netic predispositions, it will close this potentially major area of
discrimination, but will have a limited effect on commercial
health insurance.
262. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(c) (West Supp. II 1990); see Genetic Discrimination,
supra note 2, at 122-23.
263. Id. Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.), is pushing for an expansive
interpretation of who is regarded as disabled. Sherman, supra note 260, at 15.
264. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201 (West Supp. II 1990). See Genetic Discrimination, supra
note 2, at 135-37.
265. See Marvin R. Natowicz, et al., Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 465, 471 (1992).
266. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(c)(3) (West Supp. 11 1990).
267. Id. at § 12112(c)(4) (West Supp. II 1990).




VI. Proposals to Prevent Genetic Discrimination
The existing health care financing system is facing major
problems, even without the use of genetic testing to screen
health insurance applications. In 1989, there were over thirty-
three million Americans without health insurance coverage.26 9
Some segments of the population are disproportionately left
without coverage, such as Hispanic-Americans, of whom forty-
one percent have no health insurance.27 0 In addition, health care
costs have skyrocketed, increasing the importance of adequate
health insurance. Spending on health care in the United States
increased 128% from 1980 through 1989.271 Use of genetic test-
ing by insurers would certainly increase the number of unin-
sured because people at risk for genetic disease would be faced
with higher premiums or would become uninsurable. Many of
the people who would be impacted in this way are currently in-
sured because their genetic predispositions have not been
detected.
There are several options for addressing the potential im-
pact of genetic testing on the availability of health insurance.
Many of the options would also address the broader problems of
the health care financing system. The options include: 1) prohib-
iting genetic testing by insurers; 2) allowing testing, but limiting
how insurers can use the information; 3) establishing a national
health insurance program; 4) establishing high-risk insurance
pools; 5) promoting private reinsurance; 6) mandating employer-
funded health insurance; and 7) eliminating the ERISA exemp-
tion for self-insured plans.7 2 Each of these options will be
considered.
A. Prohibit Genetic Testing by Insurers
Legislation prohibiting genetic testing or the use of genetic
test results by insurers is the simplest way to prevent discrimi-
nation in the availability of coverage or rate-setting. Such a ban
269. Carl J. Schramm, Health Care Financing for All Americans, 265 JAMA 3296,
3296 (1991).
270. Emily Friedman, The Uninsured; From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491,
2491 (1991).
271. Id. at 2493.




would be most effective at the national level. However, states
could pass comparable restrictions, such as the Wisconsin stat-
ute, in the absence of federal legislation. 73 Such a prohibition
would prevent insurers from requiring genetic testing during the
application process, and from acquiring and using the results of
genetic tests performed for other purposes. This would eliminate
the incentive for individuals to avoid genetic tests recommended
by physicians or conducted for research purposes, out of the fear
that they would not be able to acquire health insurance.274
The major objective of this proposal is to maintain the sta-
tus quo, and prevent additional people from losing their health
insurance. Although this option is vigorously opposed by the in-
surance industry, 75 the actual impact on the industry would
likely be limited. Unlike AIDS, which insurers believe creates a
substantial incentive for adverse selection, most genetic predis-
positions do not present the individual with unequivocal knowl-
edge of near-term life threatening illness. Many genetic traits
only indicate a susceptibility to future illness. Thus, even if
there is adverse selection based on genetic test results, the po-
tential cost to insurers may not be as great as with AIDS, or may
not occur at all.
Under this proposal, the risks that would have been de-
tected by genetic testing would continue to be distributed across
the insurance pool. As long as no insurer had access to genetic
information, no company could gain a competitive advantage.2 76
Such a prohibition would be a very effective and relatively pain-
less way to prevent abuse of genetic information by insurers.
B. Regulate the Use of Genetic Testing by Insurers
This option includes two possibilities for regulating the use
of genetic information acquired by insurers. The first possibility
is to allow insurers to conduct genetic testing, but not allow
them to ask applicants for the results of unrelated genetic tests
273. Under the doctrine of preemption, federal law takes precedence over any incon-
sistent state law. JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 295 (3d ed. 1986).
274. Kass, supra note 8, at 30.
275. See ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE, supra note 1. The industry has also vehemently
opposed restrictions on the use of AIDS testing for risk classification. See generally Clif-
ford & Incalano, supra note 106, at 1815-17.




conducted by other parties or for other purposes. Similar to the
ban on the use of genetic information, this would prevent indi-
viduals from avoiding unrelated beneficial genetic tests for fear
of insurance implications. 7
The second alternative is to prohibit insurers from com-
pletely denying insurance based on an applicant's genetic pre-
disposition. Insurers would be allowed to attach a rider 78 deny-
ing coverage for the disease the applicant is at risk of
developing. This would allow the applicant to obtain coverage
for all other health care needs.
Under either proposal, the use of genetic testing must be
subject to certain standards. 279 Applicants must give informed
consent to the genetic tests required by the insurer. Applicants
should also be made aware that coverage may be denied or lim-
ited based on the test results. 2 0 Finally, specific tests should be
evaluated and approved by the regulatory authority to assure
test reliability.
C. Establish National Health Insurance
National health insurance has been a major topic of debate
in recent years. Insurers vehemently oppose national health in-
surance because it would essentially put them out of business.8s
There is also increasing political debate on the subject as the
number of people without health insurance rises.282
Although there are an unlimited number of ways to struc-
ture national health insurance, one likely scheme would be to
establish a single insurer in each state.283 Under such a proposal,
hospitals would receive an annual budget to cover all services.2 84
277. ,Id. at 30.
278. A rider is a restrictive condition on a policy that contains special provisions
that are not contained in the policy contract. LEWIS E. DAVIDS, DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE
226 (1977).
279. Kass, supra note 8, at 32.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., EDWARD NEUSCHLER, CANADIAN HEALTH CARE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE (1990) (evaluating the Canadian national health care system).
282. For example, Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.) is a strong supporter of a national
health care system and has introduced legislation to create such a system. S. 1446, 102d






Patients would not be billed for services and the hospitals would
consider it a budget expenditure.2 85 Fee-for-service physicians
would submit claims directly to the insuring agency.2 86
National health insurance would not only address potential
concerns regarding genetic testing, but would address the larger
problem of the uninsured.2 8 The need for genetic testing would
be eliminated under a system of national health insurance, be-
cause it would operate like a very large group policy. National
health care, however, is certain to be vigorously opposed and is
unlikely to be enacted in the near future. Thus, it does not offer
short-term protection against genetic discrimination.
D. Establish Risk Pools
Risk pools are a method of providing subsidized health in-
surance to high-risk people.2 88 Risk pools would generally be es-
tablished at the state level, and have already been created in
some states. 289 A risk pool is an insurance fund that makes cov-
erage available to the medically uninsurable and to those appli-
cants who cannot afford insurance elsewhere.2 90 Typically, poli-
cyholders pay premiums up to a legislatively imposed ceiling.291
The remaining funds may be supplied by a market-share-based
tax on insurance companies, a premium tax on individuals with
health insurance, or from general tax revenues. 29 2 Although risk
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See Kevin Grumbach, et al., Liberal Benefits, Conservative Spending; The
Physicians for a National Health Program Proposal, 265 JAMA 2549 (1991).
288. Schramm, supra note 269, at 3297.
289. Kass, supra note 8, at 34. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 692 (West Supp. 1986);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, paras. 1301-1314 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-10-1
to 8 (Burns 1992); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 514E.1-.13 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 62E.01-.17 (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-1501 to 1521 (1991); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 44-4201 to 4235 (1988 & Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-08 (Michie
1989 & Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-39-101 to 122 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 619.01-.16 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
290. James S. Todd, et al., Health Access America-Strengthening the U.S. Health-
care System, 265 JAMA 2503, 2505 (1991).
291. Id.
292. See MODEL HEALTH PLAN FOR UNINSURABLE INDIVIDUALS ACT § 7 (Nat'l Ass'n of
Ins. Comm'rs 1992). This model code has been adopted by thirteen states as a response
to the rise in the number of uninsurable individuals. NAIC Model Regulation Service




pools would not directly prevent abuse of genetic testing, they
provide a secondary source of insurance for those rejected cover-
age based on the results of genetic tests.
E. Promote Private Reinsurance
Favored by the insurance industry, private reinsurance is a
program for reducing the number of uninsurable people. 293 Rein-
surance is simply double insurance. The direct-insurer issues
policies to individuals or groups, and purchases insurance from a
second insurer to cover unexpected losses.294 This limits the di-
rect-insurer's exposure to loss from high-risk policyholders, the-
oretically encouraging direct-insurers to take on high-risk appli-
cants. 29" Reinsurance is not a complete solution because the
medically uninsurable would still be unable to buy coverage, but
it would relieve some of the burden that might otherwise fall on
the risk pools. 296 As with risk pools, reinsurance would not di-
rectly prevent abuse of genetic information, but would increase
the availability of insurance for those with a genetic predisposi-
tion to illness.
F. Mandate Employer-Funded Health Insurance
State mandated coverage could consist of a state regulatory
requirement that all employers provide health insurance to all
their employees. 29 However, to provide complete coverage of the
population, a pool similar to a risk pool must be established to
provide coverage to the unemployed. 298 The mandate to provide
coverage would include high-risk and medically uninsurable in-
dividuals. Proponents estimate that two-thirds of those cur-
rently uninsured would become insured under such a
proposal.299
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Since coverage would be mandated, this proposal would di-
rectly address the potential for abuse of genetic testing. How-
ever, such legislation would probably be opposed by the business
community due to the cost it would impose on employers. Simi-
lar to national health insurance, mandatory employer-funded
health insurance is not a likely short-term protection against ge-
netic discrimination.
G. Eliminate the ERISA Exemption for Self-Insureds
Under ERISA,800 self-insured employee health benefit plans
are not subject to state insurance regulations.30' This exemption
may blunt the effectiveness of state bans on the use of genetic
information. The exemption also impacts the viability of risk
pools because self-insureds may not be subject to premium or
market share taxes. Thus, repeal of the exemption is necessary
for effective regulation of the use of genetic information under
any of the other proposals.
These proposals are just a few of the many possible health
insurance reforms that would protect against genetic discrimina-
tion. Each would provide some measure of protection to individ-
uals with a genetic predisposition to disease. Some of the pro-
posals would also address the crisis facing the uninsured in
today's health care system.
VII. Conclusion
This Comment has analyzed the potential use and abuse of
genetic testing by the health insurance industry, and has
presented several options for preventing such abuse. The single
most effective way to prevent abuse is a ban on the use of ge-
netic information in health insurance underwriting. A federal
ban would provide comprehensive protection, but is unlikely
considering the history of congressional deference to state insur-
ance regulation. State bans modeled after the Wisconsin legisla-
tion offer a simple, effective means of protection for those with a
genetic predisposition to disease. A ban would maintain the sta-
tus quo, allowing policy-makers, citizens, and the insurance in-
300. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).




dustry time to evaluate the usefulness and consequences of ge-
netic testing. Such a ban could easily be reconsidered if there is
evidence of significant adverse selection or if necessary to adapt
to developing genetic technology. Most importantly, a ban would
allow individuals with genetic predispositions to remain covered
until health care reforms reduce or eliminate the huge numbers
of uninsured. Insurers can effectively classify risks without ge-
netic testing. A ban on the requirement or use of genetic testing
properly balances the insurers' right to fair and equitable risk
classification with the public's interest in access to affordable
health insurance.
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